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Kelly v. South Carolina: When Parole Eligibility Is a Matter of
Life and Death
Imagine you are sitting on a jury in a death penalty case. You
have found the defendant guilty and are now trying to determine an
appropriate punishment. The prosecutor indicated that the
defendant is a very dangerous person. He even told you that he
hopes you never end up only a few feet away from this person again.
You are not entirely sure that you want to see the defendant die, but
you could not live with yourself knowing this person could walk the
streets again. It is important to you to be assured that, if you choose
life imprisonment, this person will not be released on parole-ever.
Unfortunately, as a juror in South Carolina, you have been told that
parole is not an issue with which you should be concerned.1 But you
are concerned. The good news for you (and the defendant) is that the
United States Supreme Court has heard South Carolina's argument
against informing jurors of a defendant's parole ineligibility, and it
disagreed with this argument, not once, but three times.2 For the
third time in eight years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down the
South Carolina Supreme Court.3 The Court's message is loud and
clear: If there has been any indication that a defendant presents a
future danger to the public and a jury's only sentencing alternative to
the death penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, a defendant's constitutional due process rights require that the
jury be given an instruction regarding the defendant's ineligibility for
parole .
4
Kelly v. South Carolina is the Supreme Court's most recent
decision holding that when a defendant's future dangerousness is at
1. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1270 (2001) (stating that the judge
instructed the jury that "[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration");
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994) (plurality opinion) (stating that the
judge told the jury, "[y]ou are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in
reaching your verdict").
2. See Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 726, 728-29 (2002); Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at
1267; Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156.
3. See Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 734; Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1275; Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171.
4. See Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 728-29. The Fourteenth Amendment states that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that a State denies a defendant
due process by securing a death sentence based in part on the defendant's future
dangerousness, while failing to inform the jury that its only alternative to a death sentence
is life without the possibility of parole. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162.
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issue, he is entitled to a jury instruction on parole ineligibility.' This
Recent Development will examine Kelly and its two predecessors6 to
analyze why the South Carolina Supreme Court thought Kelly was
distinguishable from the U.S. Supreme Court's two earlier decisions
and why the U.S. Supreme Court determined that it is not. Further,
and perhaps more importantly, this examination of Kelly considers
the concerns of the dissenters, including two new dissenters who were
part of the majority's two earlier decisions against South Carolina.7
Based on this examination, this Recent Development concludes that
the extremely broad interpretation of future dangerousness has
created a "back door" out of the requirement that the prosecution
specifically state that the defendant will be dangerous in the future.8
Finally, this Recent Development demonstrates why, as a practical
matter, the requested instruction regarding parole ineligibility
actually makes a difference.9 The Kelly decision took an important
step in ensuring fairness to capital defendants by guaranteeing that
nearly every capital defendant will get a jury instruction on parole
ineligibility. This Recent Development argues that the next step will
be to do away with the future dangerousness requirement altogether.
An analysis of the Kelly decision begins with a look at the cases
that set the stage for the Court's decision. Gardner v. Florida"°
establishes the foundation for the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding jury instructions and disclosure of parole ineligibility. In
Gardner, the judge sentenced the defendant to death and based his
5. The idea underlying the future dangerousness requirement is that parole eligibility
only matters if the jury believes the defendant will continue to pose a threat to society
when he is released from prison. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163-64. If the prosecution tries
to encourage the jury to vote for death by making it believe that the defendant will be
dangerous in the future, the defendant has the right to demonstrate that he will not be a
danger to the public because he will never be released from prison. See id. at 161-62.
6. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. 1263; Simmons, 512 U.S. 154.
7. In Kelly, Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Kennedy joined. 122 S. Ct. at 734 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy had joined Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Shafer, 121 S. Ct.
at 1266, and Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in Simmons.
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 175 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
8. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing how defendants can use
the broad holding as a way around the requirement that the prosecution present evidence
of a defendant's future dangerousness); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text
(discussing how under Kelly only the implication of future dangerousness is required to
get the jury instruction on parole ineligibility).
9. For instance, if it makes no difference to a jury whether or not the defendant will
ever be eligible for parole, the logical conclusion would be that the instruction makes no
difference as well. This Recent Development will show that parole ineligibility does
matter to the jury. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
10. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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decision in part on an investigation report that was not made
available to the defense." The U.S. Supreme Court found that this
omission violated the defendant's constitutional right to due process.12
Although Gardner involved a specific act of withholding confidential
information from the defense by the prosecution, the Court does not
indicate that an intentional act was necessary for the finding of a due
process violation."' The Gardner plurality first noted two important
ideas previously established by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, "death
is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country ... both [in] its severity and its finality."' 4
Second, the sentencing process must satisfy the requirements of the
Due Process Clause. 5 Based on these two principles, the Court
concluded that because the defendant received a death sentence
based in part on information that he had no opportunity to explain or
deny, he was denied due process of law.'6 The Court later relies on
this conclusion when deciding the cases on jury instructions regarding
parole ineligibility.
The U.S. Supreme Court first overturned a South Carolina
decision not to inform the jury of a defendant's ineligibility for parole
in the capital case of Simmons v. South Carolina.7 Four justices 8
held that when the prosecution puts a defendant's future
dangerousness at issue and the defendant is ineligible for parole, the
defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury informed that he
will never be released on parole. 9 The plurality decided that because
the jury was not instructed on the issue of parole and the defendant's
11. Id. at 351.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 353. The Court did not base its decision on any suggestion of
prosecutorial misconduct caused by the intentional act of withholding information, but
rather on the idea that the death sentence was imposed based on information that the
defendant had no opportunity to explain or deny. See id. at 362. The Court did not state
that the intentional act was essential or even relevant to the decision.
14. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 358.
16. Id. at 362.
17. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
18. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 156. Justice O'Connor
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined. Id. at 175 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
19. Id. at 156. "At issue" means that the prosecution has made the idea of future
dangerousness an issue in the case by suggesting to the jury that the defendant will be
dangerous in the future. Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 726, 731 (2002). The Court
held in Kelly that future dangerousness could be at issue even if it is only implied. See
infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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future dangerousness was at issue, the defendant had been denied
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.2"
The defendant in Simmons was convicted of the gruesome
murder of an elderly woman. 21  During the sentencing phase, the
prosecution argued the defendant's future dangerousness to the jury
by referring to the defendant as being "in our midst" and telling the
jury that their verdict in favor of a death sentence would be "an act of
self-defense. '22  The defendant requested that the trial judge give
specific instructions to the jury about the meaning of "life
imprisonment" and the defendant's ineligibility for parole.2 3  The
judge refused and instead instructed the jury that the terms "life
imprisonment" and "death sentence" should be given their ordinary
meaning.24 The situation was further complicated when the jury sent
the judge a note during deliberations inquiring about the possibility of
parole, and the judge responded that parole was not for their
consideration.2 1 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that even if an instruction about a defendant's parole ineligibility was
required, the instruction in this case was sufficient.26
20. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states
to provide due process of law when depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property);
supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment further).
21. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156. The defendant had also pled guilty to assaulting two
other elderly women, and, under South Carolina law, these convictions made him
conclusively ineligible for parole if he were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder.
Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (stating that parole is not
authorized for any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent conviction,
following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes).
22. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157. The dissent argued that these comments were taken
out of context and were not actually referring to the defendant's future dangerousness. Id.
at 182 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Other evidence, however, exists to support the idea that
future dangerousness was at issue, including prosecution witnesses who testified that the
defendant "posed a continuing danger to elderly women." Id. at 157. For a discussion of
decisions in which the Court seemed unconcerned by the fact that a defendant's future
dangerousness was not specifically mentioned, see infra notes 66-69, 90-92 and
accompanying text.
23. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 158-60.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id. The plurality opinion was concerned that the judge's answer may have
actually misled the jury into believing "parole was available but that the jury, for some
unstated reason, should be blind to this fact." Id. at 170.
26. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (S.C. 1993). The judge told the jury that if it
sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment, "he actually will be sentenced to
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life." Simmons, 512
U.S. at 160 (emphasis added). Notably, by stating that the defendant will be sentenced for
life, the judge gave no indication as to how long the defendant would actually remain in
prison. Juries are made up of average people, and most people simply do not believe that
a sentence of life imprisonment actually means that the defendant will never be released
from prison. See infra note 36. In fact, one commentator notes that recent research
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Quoting Gardner, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court noted
that the "Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a
person 'on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to
deny or explain.' ",27 The Court decided that the trial judge's refusal
to instruct the jury on the parole issue after the prosecution had put
the defendant's future dangerousness at issue, in essence, denied the
defendant the ability to refute or explain his future dangerousness.28
South Carolina argued that an instruction regarding the ineligibility
of parole is misleading because it fails to take into account
possibilities, such as legislative reform or clemency, that could also
result in the release of the defendant. 29  The plurality found this
argument unpersuasive, however, noting that an instruction informing
the jury of the defendant's ineligibility for parole is legally accurate
and that a majority of states that provide life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole allow for this instruction.3" The Court thus
held that the defendant's right to due process was violated and
remanded the case.31
indicates that "most Americans believe convicted murderers spend only about 7 years in
prison-unless they are sentenced to death." H. A. Bedau, Prison Homicides, Recidivist
Murder, and Life Imprisonment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 176, 181 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997); see also infra note 36
(discussing studies indicating that people do not believe life imprisonment means the
defendant will never get out of prison).
27. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
28. Id. at 162 ("The State thus succeeded in securing a death sentence on the ground,
at least in part, of petitioner's future dangerousness, while at the same time concealing
from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternative, that life
imprisonment meant life without parole."). Due process requires that a defendant be
given the opportunity to explain or deny any accusations made by the State. See Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977). Therefore, the defendant must be given the chance to
explain or deny his future dangerousness by informing the jury that he will not be released
into society. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165, 169.
29. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166.
30. Id. at 166-67. The plurality noted, "At present there are 26 States that both
employ juries in capital sentencing and provide for life imprisonment without parole as an
alternative to capital punishment. In 17 of these, the jury expressly is informed of the
defendant's ineligibility for parole." Id. at 167 n.7. The plurality also noted that the State
is still allowed to argue that the defendant will continue to pose a danger to others in
prison as a reason to execute him. Id. at 165 n.5.
31. Id. at 171. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the judgment, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, allowed for the reversal by a vote of seven to two.
Id. at 175 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The separate opinion indicated that
either the trial judge or the defense counsel could inform the jury of the defendant's
ineligibility for parole. Id. at 177 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor also stated that the instruction was not constitutionally required if the
defendant's future dangerousness was not at issue. Id. at 176 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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The Simmons dissenters accepted that the parole instruction was
reasonable, but did not find it to be constitutionally required." They
argued that decisions about jury instructions should be left to the
states, pointing to the various state sentencing structures.33 Many of
these sentencing structures do not require an instruction on parole,
and some allow the jury to decide whether the defendant should ever
be eligible for parole.34 The dissent attempted to illustrate that a
national consensus on the issue did not exist.35 The term "life
imprisonment," however, is ambiguous in the parole context because
people have different ideas about whether the term includes parole,
and a jury should be fully informed about the consequences of its
decision.36 The dissent admitted that many of the states that do not
32. Id. at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia expressed concern that there is no
need to interfere with the states' sentencing schemes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I fear we
have read today the first page of a whole new chapter in the 'death-is-different'
jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of composing.").
33. Id. at 183 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)).
34. Id. at 179-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 180 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Numerous studies indicate that Americans do not believe that life imprisonment
actually means that a defendant will be in prison for the rest of his natural life. As noted
earlier, one commentator points out recent research indicating that most people believe
convicted murderers spend only about seven years in prison. Bedau, supra note 26, at 181.
One study found that in South Carolina, the median-juror estimate of years actually
served by capital murderers who were not sentenced to death was seventeen. John H.
Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 404 (2001). Based on those results, a typical juror in South Carolina would have
expected the nineteen-year-old defendant in the Shafer parole ineligibility case to be
released at the dangerously young age of thirty-six. Id. Another study found that only
four percent of Americans believed that life imprisonment meant imprisonment for life,
and the average time people thought a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment would
spend in prison was fifteen years. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of
the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 26, at 90, 99. The same study,
however, revealed the desire of people to ensure that a convicted murderer never gets out
of prison so that he will never victimize anyone else and never have a chance to live a
normal life. Id. It follows that if the primary goal of a jury is to ensure that a convicted
capital murderer never gets out of prison, and the jury thinks the only way to accomplish
this goal is to sentence the defendant to death, then that is what it will do. Indeed, at least
one study has found that the shorter the period of time a juror thinks a defendant will
serve in prison, the more likely he is to vote for death. Blume et al., supra, at 404; see also
Laurie B. Berberich, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1301, 1318-20 (2001) (noting that capital sentencing is unreliable when
the jury is not fully informed). Victims' family members would certainly hope a capital
murderer is never released from prison. One father whose twelve-year-old daughter was
raped and murdered expressed his doubt that a convicted murderer would really spend the
rest of his life in prison: "The reality of incarceration in America is that everything is
based on a lie. We sentence individuals to life without parole and then parole them. We
sentence people to life and put them on the streets in 20 years." Marc Klaas, I'll Be There
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require the instruction do include "life without parole" as one of the
sentencing choices. 37 If a jury is given a choice between death, life
imprisonment without parole, and life imprisonment, it logically
would understand the difference between the two life sentences-one
allows for parole and the other does not. Further, if the jury can
choose whether the defendant will ever be eligible for parole, it
recognizes the difference between its choices.
Almost seven years after the Simmons decision, South Carolina
again found itself admonished by the Supreme Court in Shafer v.
South Carolina.38 South Carolina decided Simmons no longer applied
because of a statutory change in its sentencing process.39 Under the
new scheme, jurors in capital cases are required to answer two
questions. 0 First, they must decide whether the State has proven a
statutory aggravating circumstance.41 If the jury fails to decide
unanimously that the State has met this burden, the judge will
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole or a
mandatory thirty year sentence.42 If the jury decides the State has
proven at least one aggravating factor, it must sentence the defendant
to either death or life imprisonment without parole.43
At Shafer's trial, the judge explained that he refused to instruct
the jury on the parole issue because the prosecutor did not place the
To Watch My 12-Year-Old Daughter's Murderer Go Down, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at
35.
37. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 179 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001).
39. Id. at 1270; State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 528 (S.C. 2000).
40. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267.
41. Id. Such a circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see
also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 2001) ("When the state seeks the death
penalty, upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding.... [T]he jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in
... aggravation of the punishment."). Aggravating factors are meant to narrow the death-
eligible class in order to conform to the requirement of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), that a death penalty scheme must limit the risk of arbitrary application. NINA
RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 120
(2001). In South Carolina, these factors include circumstances such as murder committed
in the course of kidnapping or burglary, murder that knowingly creates a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place, murder for money, murder of two or
more people in the same act, murder of a child, and murder of a peace officer during the
performance of his official duties. § 16-3-20(C)(a).
42. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267; see also § 16-3-20(C) (stating that if the jury fails to
unanimously agree to a death sentence, the judge must impose a sentence of life
imprisonment or mandatory term of thirty years).
43. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267; see also § 16-3-20(B) (stating that if any aggravating
factor is found, the jury must impose death or life imprisonment); infra note 52 and
accompanying text (discussing under what circumstances the jury makes the sentencing
decision).
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defendant's future dangerousness at issue." Like the Simmons jury,
the Shafer jury sent a note to the judge during deliberation inquiring
about the possibility of parole.45 Also similar to Simmons, the judge
simply told the jurors that parole was not their concern.46  After
receiving the judge's notice, the jury quickly sentenced Shafer to
death. 7 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
address the issue of future dangerousness, but instead decided that
Simmons was inapplicable under the new sentencing scheme.48
Specifically, the court held that because death and life without parole
were no longer the only two sentencing alternatives for a defendant
convicted of a capital offense, Simmons no longer applied.49
The U.S. Supreme Court, this time with a clear majority,
overturned the ruling of South Carolina's highest court." The Court
rejected South Carolina's argument because, although a minimum
thirty-year sentence is available to capital defendants, it may only be
imposed by a judge in cases involving no aggravating factors and may
never be imposed by a jury. 1 The jury is permitted to decide on the
appropriate sentence only if it finds the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, and if it does so, its only sentencing options are life
imprisonment without parole or death. 2 The Court held that when
future dangerousness is at issue, even under South Carolina's new
sentencing scheme, the jury must be informed about parole
ineligibility. 3  Justice Scalia dissented, reiterating his earlier
44. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1268. Whether future dangerousness was actually at issue is
not clear; the trial judge found that the prosecutor's closing argument only had come close
to the line, but had not crossed it. Id.
45. Id. at 1269; State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524, 527 (S.C. 2000).
46. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1269; Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 527.
47. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1270. The jury deliberated for nearly three and one-half
hours before asking the judge about Shafer's parole eligibility, but it returned a sentence
approximately eighty minutes after the judge told them parole was not their concern. Id.
at 1269-70. Because almost three-fourths of the jury's deliberation had occurred before it
was told not to consider parole, it is possible that much of the earlier debate involved
parole eligibility.
48. Id.; Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 528.
49. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1270-71; Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 528.
50. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1275. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in this
opinion; all of the other Justices joined in the majority opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg. Id. at 1265.
51. Id. at 1272; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp. 2001) (stating that if the
jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance but does not recommend death, the trial
judge must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
52. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1272.
53. Id. at 1273. The Court also found that because of" 'the longstanding practice of
parole availability,' " many jurors may not know whether or not the defendant will be
eligible for parole, and more than just a passing word about the defendant spending his
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objections and stating that while this holding was a logical extension
of Simmons, it still lacked constitutional basis.54 Justice Thomas also
reiterated his earlier objections and further stated that, even
accepting the decision in Simmons, he believed that the judge's
instructions were sufficient."
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
heard Kelly v. South Carolina.56 The defendant in Kelly was
convicted of "an extraordinarily brutal murder, kidnaping and armed
robbery, and for possession of a knife during the commission of a
violent crime."57  At the sentencing phase, the defense counsel
requested a jury instruction on the issue of parole, as provided for in
Simmons.58  The State indicated it would not argue future
dangerousness in order to avoid Simmons, but the defense claimed
the State had already argued the issue through the evidence
presented.59 The trial judge disagreed and found that the evidence
went to character, not future dangerousness.6' During closing
arguments the prosecutor referred to the defendant as "the butcher of
Batesburg" and "Bloody Billy," and stated that "murderers will be
murderers."'" On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the trial judge's decision to not instruct the jury on parole
ineligibility and held that Simmons did not apply for two reasons:
first, under the new sentencing scheme, life without parole is not the
only alternative to a death sentence; and second, future
dangerousness was not at issue.62
natural life in prison is required to inform the jury. Id. (quoting Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1994)). The Court noted that the fact that the jury asked
about parole illustrated their uncertainty. Id. at 1273-74. Finally, the Court disposed of
the State's final argument that future dangerousness was not actually at issue by
determininig that the issue was not ripe. Id. at 1274-75. Because the South Carolina
Supreme Court had ruled that Simmons did not apply, it did not decide if Shafer's future
dangerousness had been at issue. Id. The Court, therefore, remanded that issue to the
South Carolina Supreme Court after determining that Simmons did apply. Id.
54. Id. at 1275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1276 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is not the Court's role to
micromanage state sentencing proceedings or develop model jury instructions").
56. 122 S. Ct. 726 (2002).
57. Id. at 729.
58. Id.; State v. Kelly, 540 S.E.2d 851, 856 (S.C. 2001).
59. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 729; Kelly, 540 S.E.2d at 856-57. The prosecution had
presented testimony regarding the defendant's behavior in jail, including evidence that
Kelly had made a knife and taken part in an escape attempt. See Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 729;
Kelly, 540 S.E.2d at 856.
60. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 729; Kelly, 540 S.E.2d at 856.
61. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 729-30.
62. Id. at 730-31; Kelly, 540 S.E.2d at 857-58.
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The U.S. Supreme Court quickly rejected the first argument
because the issue had already been resolved in Shafer.63 In regard to
the second argument, the Court held that the South Carolina
Supreme Court had used the appropriate standard, but applied it
incorrectly to the facts.64 The correct inquiry was "whether [the
defendant's] future dangerousness was 'a logical inference from the
evidence' or was 'injected into the case through the State's closing
argument.' "65 The South Carolina Supreme Court had decided that
because the evidence presented by the prosecution related to the
defendant's dangerousness while in prison, it was not the type of
evidence contemplated by Simmons, nor was it the type of evidence
that required a jury instruction regarding parole.66 The Court,
however, held that the evidence still supported the notion that the
defendant was dangerous in general. 7 The majority found that the
evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness remained relevant
to a Simmons analysis, even if that same evidence could support
inferences other than the consequences that would follow if a
defendant were released on parole.66 Further, the Court was
unpersuaded by the prosecution's argument that Kelly was
distinguishable because the Kelly jury had not sent a note to the judge
inquiring about parole as the juries in the two prior cases had done.69
The number of dissenters in Kelly was greater than in the two
earlier cases discussing the issue.7" Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, suggested the idea that
the Kelly holding indicated a shift in the Court's stance regarding
63. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 730. The South Carolina Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Kelly on January 8, 2001, and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shafer was
not issued until more than two months later on March 20, 2001. State v. Kelly, 343 S.C.
350, 350 (2001); Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1263 (2001).
64. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 731.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court also held that the prosecutor's references to the defendant as
"Bloody Billy" were meant to instill the idea of dangerousness. Id. at 732-33.
68. Id. at 732.
69. Id. at 733. The Court held that it was the trial judge's duty to properly explain the
law to the jury, whether they asked for it or not. Id. (citing 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 485, at 375 (3d ed. 2000)).
70. In both Simmons and Shafer, Justices Scalia and Thomas were the only dissenters.
Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1275 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1275-76
(Thomas, J. dissenting); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Kelly, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined the dissent to make a total of four dissenters. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 734
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 736 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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when a judge must instruct a jury on the issue of parole eligibility.71
Under the new heightened standard, evidence that raises an
implication of future dangerousness triggers a judge's instruction.
Rehnquist stated that if Simmons meant to encompass this situation,
the Court would have held that a jury instruction on parole eligibility
is always required.7 3 Rehnquist believed that the holding in Kelly had
virtually no connection with the due process rationale in Simmons. 4
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Scalia joined. He stated that "[w]hile we were informed in Simmons
that the Court's intent was to create a requirement that would apply
in only a limited number of cases, today's sweeping rule was an
entirely foreseeable consequence of Simmons."75 Justice Thomas again
admonished the majority for meddling in and micromanaging the
state's jury instruction proceedings "under the guise that the
Constitution requires us to do so."76
Thus, the rule that began in Simmons has continued to grow into
a new tool for defendants who will be sentenced for capital offenses.
While the dissenters in Kelly were uncomfortable with the direction
the rule is taking, this direction is a logical extension of the Court's
previous holdings. Perhaps defendants may use Kelly's broad holding
as a way around the requirement that the prosecution present
evidence of the defendants' future dangerousness, by simply showing
some slight implication of future dangerousness.77
As noted above, the new dissenters were concerned that the
broad holding of Kelly has weakened the requirement that future
dangerousness be at issue.78 Although the holding of Kelly is quite
broad, it did not abolish the future dangerousness requirement.
71. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 735 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Arguably, Kelly has created a rather large
loophole in the "evidence of future dangerousness" requirement. See infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
74. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 734 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 736 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas first noted
Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement that the due process basis for the Simmons rule is no
longer relevant and pointed out that he never thought such a basis existed in the first
place. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 737 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 731-33 (citing examples of evidence that gave only an implication of
future dangerousness and was not introduced for that purpose); id. at 735 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that "the test is now whether evidence was introduced at trial that
raises an 'implication' of future dangerousness to society" and noting that it is hard to
imagine a capital case where no evidence is presented from which a juror might make such
an inference).
78. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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Rather, it recognized that future dangerousness can be at issue even if
the prosecutor does not explicitly say the words, "This defendant
poses a future danger to society."79 This recognition is good news for
capital defendants, and likely an accurate reflection of reality.8"
One study of South Carolina capital juries argues that future
dangerousness is at issue in virtually all capital trials.81 The study
reveals that "future dangerousness plays a highly prominent role in
the jury's discussions during the penalty phase."82 Other than the
defendant's possible return to society, the only topic that juries spend
more time discussing is the crime itself.83  Discussion of the
defendant's future dangerousness outweighed both mitigating factors
and the defendant's dangerousness in prison.' The study concludes
that, ironically, defendants are better situated when the prosecution
introduces their potential for future dangerousness directly, because
the judge then instructs the jury on parole eligibility.85 A better
approach would be to do away with the "at issue" requirement
altogether so that all defendants would be entitled to the instruction.86
The State may make a tactical decision not to mention future
dangerousness. Indeed, the prosecutors in both Shafer and Kelly
specifically informed the judge that they would not argue future
dangerousness in order to take their cases out of the scope of
79. This is a phrase created by the author to demonstrate what may be required under
a very strict standard. The recognition by the Court that this phrase is not required is
important because it may change the tactical decisions of the prosecution. See infra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
81. See Blume et al., supra note 36, at 398-99. This study was conducted through
individual interviews of 916 jurors who sat on 257 capital trials in eleven different states,
including South Carolina. Id. at 403. Each juror answered a series of questions that
covered a variety of topics, including the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, evidence
presented, legal instructions given, and the deliberation process. Id.
82. Id. at 404.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 410.
86. Id. Another approach would be for state legislators to provide for the instruction
in their statutes. Indeed, Pennsylvania is the only state other than South Carolina that
offers life without parole as an alternative to the death penalty, which does not require the
judge to inform the jury of parole ineligibility. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (West
1998 & Supp. 2002); see Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1271 n.4 (2001); see also
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Chide South Carolina in a Death Sentence, Again, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2002, at A25 (noting that "[o]f 30 states with the death penalty that offer the
choice of life without parole, only South Carolina and Pennsylvania do not require that
jurors be fully informed about the choice"). As long as even one state refuses to provide
the instruction, however, the Court must step in to protect a defendant's due process
rights.
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Simmons.87 If prosecutors believe it is inherent in the other
statements they make, they may choose not to argue future
dangerousness specifically. They would rather risk that future
dangerousness was implied and not introduce parole ineligibility, than
point out the obvious danger and be forced to explain clearly to the
jury their choice of sentence.88 This kind of behavior makes one
wonder why, if a prosecutor is so sure that a jury will find death to be
the appropriate punishment, he will so vehemently resist making the
sentencing choices clear.89
Although the Court in Kelly has not expressly terminated the
requirement that future dangerousness be at issue in order to get a
jury instruction on parole, its broad ruling on what meets the "at
issue" requirement has given future capital defendants room to
breathe. As Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized, "[i]t is difficult to
envision a capital sentencing hearing where the State presents no
evidence from which a juror might make [an inference regarding the
defendant's future dangerousness]." '9 Capital defendants likely hope
that the Chief Justice's prediction is correct when they want the
instruction on parole eligibility-a clear benefit of the broad holding
in Kelly. Because nearly all cases imply future dangerousness, Kelly
requires the instruction on parole eligibility in nearly all cases.91 The
next logical step would be to eliminate the requirement that future
dangerousness be at issue. The decision to take someone's life away
is a very important one, and juries should be fully informed of the
options available to them when making that decision. The Court in
Kelly extended the protection of a defendant further by deciding that
future dangerousness only needs to be implied to trigger the
87. Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 726, 729 (2002); Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267-68.
88. In fact, in the State's brief in Kelly, South Carolina argued that it was free to make
such a tactical decision and that in doing so it was not receiving any unfair advantage.
Brief for Respondent at 35-36, Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 726 (2002) (No. 00-
9280). The State further pointed out that its law disfavors the introduction of collateral
circumstances, such as parole, and argued that this practice is acceptable as long as it stays
within the due process limits of Simmons. Id. at 49-50. In its brief for Shafer, the State
argued that, because the prosecution did not argue future dangerousness, Simmons did not
apply. Brief for Respondent at 42-49, Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001)
(No. 00-5250).
89. See supra note 86 (discussing how most other states require the jury instruction on
parole ineligibility in their statutes).
90. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 735 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's broad
holding in Kelly and the evidence that implied future dangerousness).
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requirement for a jury instruction on parole eligibility.92 Therefore,
one could easily imagine the Court finding that fairness and due
process require the instruction, even without an implication of future
dangerousness.
An argument to require a jury instruction on parole eligibility is
worth very little without some evidence that, as a practical matter,
whether a defendant will ever be eligible for parole makes any
difference to a jury. A national survey of opinions about the death
penalty reveals that although a majority of Americans support the
death penalty in the abstract, those numbers are reduced to a
minority percentage as alternatives are offered.93 Only forty-nine
percent of Americans support the death penalty if life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is an option.94 One juror stated that
for the jury on which he sat to opt for life imprisonment, they had to
be assured the defendant would never be released; but because they
did not believe that would happen, they believed that they had no
alternative to a death sentence.95 Notably, for a jury to select an
alternative to the death penalty, it must believe that the alternative is
meaningful or similarly harsh.96
92. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. at 732 (noting that even though the evidence presented may have
gone towards Kelly's character, it also implied that he would be a danger to society in the
future).
93. See Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing For Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to
the Death Penalty (Apr. 1993), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpic.r07.html (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). The poll results cited in this report are based on a
nationwide survey of one thousand registered voters conducted between February 28 and
March 1, 1993, by Greenberg/Lake and the Tarrance Group. Id. This sample likely yields
a margin of error of +/- 3.1%. Id.
94. Id. Further, only forty-one percent of Americans continue their support if
restitution to the victim's family is included with the life imprisonment without parole
option. Id. This type of punishment would include some kind of monetary payment from
the convicted murderer to the victim's family. Id.
95. J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's Right to a
Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 327, 392 (1993). For a disturbing
look at numerous cases with jury questions regarding parole, see id. app. I, at 368-90, of
Professor Lane's article. See also supra note 36 (discussing juror misconceptions about life
imprisonment and the ramifications of those misconceptions).
96. William Bowers, -Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's
Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
223, 227 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995). People accept the death
penalty because they do not believe there is a meaningful alternative, but support for the
death penalty plummets when life without the possibility of parole plus restitution is
offered as an alternative. Id. at 227-31. These misconceptions about the possibility of
parole make people think life imprisonment is not a meaningful alternative. Id. at 232. If
jurors knew that life imprisonment truly existed without the possibility of parole, they
might choose that sentence over death. Id.
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Perhaps one of the most telling examples of juries needing to be
certain that the defendant would never be released from prison is that
the juries in both Shafer and Simmons must have been concerned
about parole because they actually sent a note to the judge asking for
clarification. It seems unlikely that the jury would ask about parole
eligibility if the issue of parole did not matter to them. The Kelly
Court was correct in holding that the fact that a jury asks about
parole eligibility is simply illustrative of the point, and not
determinative to getting the instruction on parole.97 Assuming that
jurors will not think about parole eligibility just because a judge
instructs them not to is unrealistic. Whether a convicted murderer
will ever be out on the streets again likely will weigh on a juror's
mind.98 Our justice system cannot afford to ignore the chance that
parole does matter to the jury. Such ignorance would risk sentencing
people to death, when, perhaps, those chosen to pass judgment would
find a more appropriate punishment if given the option.
Kelly v. South Carolina has taken the previous holdings by the
U.S. Supreme Court in a welcome, new direction. The broad holding
now requires an instruction to capital juries on parole ineligibility
when life imprisonment without parole is the jury's alternative
sentence and the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, even if
only by implication. This extension will cover many new cases,
because dangerousness almost certainly is inherent in the idea of
being a cold-blooded killer.99 This progression is a logical step
because defendants have the right to have a decision as critical as
whether they live or die decided by a group of twelve fully-informed
peers. Furthermore, future dangerousness can easily be on
everyone's mind without the prosecutor saying the words. 1°0 Current
Supreme Court decisions clearly provide more protection for
defendants facing the death penalty than those prior to Kelly. Even
more protection, however, could be afforded to defendants by
eliminating the "at issue" requirement. For now, capital defendants
will have to take what they can get, and be thankful for it.
KRISTIE ELLISON SHUFELT
97. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
98. In fact, one study of South Carolina capital jurors concluded that "jurors'
deliberations emphasize dangerousness and that misguided fears of early release generate
death sentences." Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instruction in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1993).
99. See supra notes 67-68, 90 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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